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Abstract 
Although value appropriation and  value maximization a r e  
fundamental for any firm's economic activities, previous research has 
tended to treat them separately and to focus on each issue while taking 
the other for granted. This paper suggests that the two processes, i.e., 
value appropriation and value maximization, are not separate; rather, 
they are highly interrelated and reinforce each other through mutual 
trust among major stakeholders, a crucial linkage between the two 
processes. Specifically, this paper presents that fair value appropriation 
- i.e., appropriating value to the stakeholders in proportion to their 
stakes in the firm - contributes to the development of trust from the 
stakeholders, not only directly, but also indirectly through strength- 
ening moral obligations of internal organizational members, particularly 
managers, to the stakeholders. The present paper also shows how 
mutual trust with the stakeholders leads to value maximization. After 
examining the reinforcing effects of value maximization on value 
appropriation, this paper concludes with some discussion about social 
legitimacy of a firm and the roles of managers. 
1. Introduction 
A firm faces two central issues: 1) how to maximize the  value 
of the  firm's outputs ,  i.e., value maximization; a n d  2) how to  
- 
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divide up  the value produced by the firm among its various 
stakeholders, i.e., value appropriation. Although the two issues 
are fundamental for any firm's economic activities, previous 
research has tended to treat them distinctly and to focus on 
each issue separately, taking the other issue for granted. 
Of the  two issues ,  value appropriation h a s  at tracted 
substantial attention from both mass media (e.g., The Economist, 
1996) and academics. Most previous studies, particularly in 
economics and strategic management, have perceived the 
maximization of "profit" or "shareholder value" a s  a firm's 
objective. These studies recognize that the basic source of profit 
or shareholder value is the creation of value for the customer. 
However, they also acknowledge that the value created by the 
firm is potential profit, not actual profit, and is distributed 
among the stakeholders by competition or bargaining power. By 
focusing on "profit" and "shareholder value" maximization, these 
studies tend to be more interested in the issue of how to 
maximize the value which is appropriable by the firm or 
shareholders, than in the issue of how to maximize the value 
perceived by the customer. 
Some other studies have examined the value maximization of a 
firm's outputs, not the maximization of profit or shareholder 
value. Particularly, a recent study (Moran & Ghoshal, 1996) 
maintains that competition should be dedicated, not to value 
appropriation, but to value creation through the innovative 
combinations of firms' existing resources. Arguing that value 
creation is the major source of institutional legitimacy of firms, 
this study examines the detailed processes of value creation by 
firms. 
This article presents that the processes of value appropriation 
and value maximization are not separate, but highly interrelated 
with each other, suggesting "mutual trust" among major 
stakeholders as a linkage between the two processes. This article 
first reviews the ways of appropriating value proposed in existing 
theories, identifying the fundamental differences between value 
maximization and profit or shareholder value maximization. The 
next section of this article then examines how the ways of 
appropriating value among the stakeholders affect the develop- 
ment of trust from them. Specifically, this article presents that 
fair value appropriation contributes to the development of trust 
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from stakeholders, not only directly, but also indirectly through 
strengthening moral obligations to the stakeholders of internal 
organizational members, particularly managers. The following 
section articulates how mutual trust with the stakeholders leads 
to the maximization of the value of the firm's outputs. After 
examining the reinforcing effects of value maximization on value 
appropriation, the final section concludes with some discussion 
about social legitimacy of a firrn and the roles of managers. 
2. Value Appropriation 
This section first identifies different types of value that each 
stakeholder, as  resource providers, contribute to the final value 
of the firm's outputs. This section then argues that profit or 
shareholder value maximization may be simply a way of 
appropriating value, not necessarily a way of maximizing the 
value perceived by the customer, reviewing the value appropria- 
tion suggested in existing theories. 
2.1 Value Components 
The resource-based view perceives a firm a s  a bundle of 
resources (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). The firm produces 
its outputs by employing a bundle of the resources provided by 
various resource contributors such as  employees, suppliers, 
investors, and even customers. Broadly speaking, the value of 
the firm's outputs consists of three components: 1) the intrinsic 
value of the resources used for its outputs, 2) the firm-specific 
value of the resources, and 3) the synergetic value, i.e., the value 
created by the combinations of the resources. Each resource 
provider or stakeholder is thus perceived to contribute to the 
final value of the firm's outputs: (1) by providing the intrinsic 
value of the resource held by the resource contributor, (2) by 
making investments in developing the firm-specific value of the 
resource, and (3) by cooperating to efficiently and effectively 
combine with other resources the resource possessed by the 
resource holder, which creates synergetic value from the combi- 
nations. 
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The intrinsic value of resources and Ricardian rents 
The intrinsic value of a resource refers to the value of the 
resource which is independent of firms using it. According to 
Ricardo (1821), land varies in fertility. When demand is higher 
than the supply provided by fertile land, it becomes economic to 
grow corn on less fertile land. If this is the case, the farmer who 
owns more fertile land earns a profit, i.e., the productivity 
difference between the farmer's land and marginal land. This 
extra profit is called "Ricardian rents." It is noted that the 
intrinsic value of fertile (or less fertile) land remains constant 
regardless of who owns it. Therefore, Ricardian rents can be 
viewed a s  the difference between the intrinsic value of a 
particular resource possessed by a firm and the intrinsic value 
of the same type, but marginally productive resources. 
Ricardian rents from a resource require two conditions. First, 
the resource should be intrinsically superior in efficiency (e.g., 
more fertile land) to other resources (e.g., less fertile land) and 
scarce (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993). Firms 
endowed with the intrinsically superior resource are able to 
produce more efficiently or better satisfy customer needs; thus, 
the customer value of the outputs is higher than that of the 
outputs produced by firms with inferior resources. However, if 
intrinsically superior resources are sufficient enough to satisfy 
demand (i.e.,  if inferior resources are not employed for 
production), firms cannot earn rents. Therefore, the intrinsically 
superior resource should be scarce to fully satisfy demand for its 
service, so that inferior resources are brought into production as 
well (Peteraf, 1993). 
Secondly, to earn Ricardian rents, a firm must not simply 
employ intrinsically superior and scarce resources, but must 
also own them. If the market for a resource is perfect so that its 
market value reflects its intrinsic value, the firm has to pay the 
market value for the use of the resource which is equal to its 
intrinsic value. Otherwise, the owner of the resource will not 
stay in the firm, leaving for other potential users who are willing 
to pay the market value. Therefore, a firm can achieve Ricardian 
rents from a resource only when the firm already has owned1) 
1) May want to explain that prior ownership only leads to Ricardian rents only 
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the resource that has become scarce and superior to other 
resources. Examples of such resources include the ownership of 
valuable land, locational advantages, and efficient plants. 
A firm may achieve competitive advantages by owning rare and 
intrinsically superior resources, since the ownership enables the 
firm to earn Ricardian rents. In practice, however, firms do not 
possess the permanent ownership of all the rare and intrinsical- 
ly superior resources required for their economic activities. Most 
resources, perhaps the more valuable resources, cannot be 
permanently owned, partly because of the very nature of the 
resources (e.g., human resources). These resources are 
temporarily owned or used, not permanently owned, by the firm. 
As long as the "strategic factor markets" (Barney, 1986) are 
efficient, firms cannot enjoy Ricardian rents from the resources 
not permanently owned by them. 
Firms may secure the permanent ownership of some other 
resources (e.g., inputs from suppliers) by acquiring the resource 
providers. But again, if the strategic factor markets for those 
resources are efficient, and thus, their market value reflects 
their intrinsic value, firms cannot achieve Ricardian rents from 
the resources; thus, the firms do not need to acquire these 
resources. 
According to Barney (1986), a firm may achieve Ricardian 
rents from a particular resource under two conditions, both of 
which should be met. Firstly, the market for the resource is not 
efficient so that different firms have different expectations about 
the future value of the resource. Secondly, the firm has better 
insights into the future value of the resource than other firms, 
or better fortune or luck, so that the firm can pay for the 
resource significantly less than its intrinsic economic value. 
Whatever the reasons are, the reality is that firms possess the 
permanent ownership of only a few resources required for their 
economic activities. Other, perhaps more valuable, resources are 
simply used or temporarily owned by the firms. Thus, if the 
strategic factor markets are efficient, firms may not earn 
Ricardian rents from those valuable, non-possessed resources. 
if the prior price paid did not reflect future scarcity & superiority.(assuming 
perfect capital markets) 1.e. the perceived intrinsic price of ownership did not 
equal the true intrinsic price of ownership. 
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TheJrrn-specijlc value of resources and quasi-rents 
The value of firm outputs reflects not only the intrinsic values 
of input factors, but also their values improved by various firm- 
specific factors. These improved values may come from the firm's 
better use of the input factors (Penrose, 1959, Mahoney & 
Pandian, 1992), such as assigning employees to the tasks that 
better suit them (Prescott & Visscher, 1980; Tomer, 1987) or by 
making better allocations of financial resources toward high 
yield uses (Bower, 1970; Williamson, 1975). 
This firm-specific value of a resource is thus distinguished 
from its intrinsic value in that the former becomes negligible 
outside the firm while the latter remains constant across 
different firms. If the resource is so immobile or idiosyncratic 
that it has no other use outside the firm (Rumelt, 1982; 
Williamson, 1979), its intrinsic value is zero since it cannot add 
any value outside the firm. The value of this completely 
idiosyncratic resource consists entirely of the firm-specific 
value.2) Some resources are imperfectly mobile, that is, they are 
tradeable but more valuable within the current firm than in 
other firms. These types of resources have the same intrinsic 
value across different firms, which is lower than their value in 
the current firm. Therefore, the firm-specific value of a resource 
indicates the difference between the value of the resource within 
the firm and its value outside the firm or its intrinsic value. This 
firm-specific value of a resource represents "quasi-rents" or 
"Pareto rents" which are often defined as  the excess of a 
resource's value over either its salvage value or its value in its 
next best use (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Peteraf, 1993). 
The synergetic value and Schumpeterian rents 
A firm can also add value to i ts  outputs through new 
combinations of available resources (Moran & Ghoshal, 1996; 
Penrose, 1959; Schumpeter, 1934). These new combinations 
enable the firm to produce its outputs more efficiently and/or 
produce new outputs that better satisfy customer needs and 
tastes than existing outputs. Schumpeter perceived innovation 
as "the carrying out of new combinations" which indicates "to 
2) Not necessarily true. (resource could have synergetic values a s  well) 
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produce other things or the same things by a different method 
[or to] combine these materials and forces differently" (Schu- 
mpeter, 1934: 65-66; Moran & Ghoshal, 1996). That is, innova- 
tion of the economic system consists largely of a "recombination 
of conceptual and physical materials that were previously in 
existence" (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 130). This new and additional 
value created by this type of innovation or by the new combina- 
tions of available resources is called "Schumpeterian rents." 
The importance of the synergetic value of resources or the new 
and additional value from resource combinations is also 
recognized by the resource-based perspective. which emphasizes 
the firm's "new combinations of resources" (Penrose, 1959: 85) 
as  a means of achieving sustainable competitive advantages 
(Ghemawat, 1986; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). In a diversified or 
multi-business firm, the value created by resource combina- 
tions, also called synergies or economies of scope, is treated as 
the economic justification for the existence of the diversified firm 
(Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1986). 
The synergetic value of resources is related to the firm-specific 
value in that the latter also requires combinations with other 
resources available to the firm. The subtle difference between 
the two types of value, however, is that whereas the firm-specific 
value arises from the resource combinations which are highly 
firm-specific, the synergetic value comes from the resource 
combinations which are possible, but neither recognized nor 
executed, in other firms. Therefore, the primary source of the 
synergetic value is the creativity of an entrepreneur who has 
recognized the value of the new ways of combining the resources 
that are available, not only to a particular firm, but also to other 
firms. 
2.2 Value Appropriation in Existing Theories 
Value maximization and proJt or shareholder value maximization 
A firm produces its outputs by utilizing the resources provided 
by various resource holders. The value created by a firm is the 
difference between the value perceived by the customer of its 
outputs and the value of the resources provided by the resource 
holders (i.e., the intrinsic value of the resources). The value 
created by the firm, which consists of both firm-specific value 
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and synergetic value, is then distributed among many resource 
providers largely through the pricing mechanism or bargaining 
power over the resource providers. The higher the bargaining 
power of the firm over its customer (e.g., the higher demand over 
the supply of the firm's outputs), the higher the price of the 
outputs,  and then the higher the proportion of the value 
appropriated to the firm ("producer surplus") and the lower the 
proportion of the value appropriated to the customer ("consumer 
surplus"). Likewise, the higher the bargaining power of the firm 
over its resource providers, the lower the costs of the resources, 
the higher the proportion of the value appropriated by the firm, 
and the lower the value appropriated for the resource providers. 
In this sense, the value created by the firm is quite different 
from profit or shareholder value. That is ,  profit is  value 
appropriated by the firm from the total value created by the 
firm, whereas shareholder value is value appropriated for the 
shareholders, one of the major resource providers. 
Value appropriation in existing theories 
The ways of appropriating value differ across different 
theories. Assuming perfect market competition where end 
customers have the maximum bargaining power, neoclassical 
economics views the end customers as  those who appropriate 
most value or "economic rents" in the system. In this perspec- 
tive, all the other stakeholders or resource providers receive only 
"normal profits." 
Theories in industrial organization economics and the re- 
source-based view perceive profit maximization as  the firm's 
objective. This requires the firm to appropriate as  much value as  
possible from its  stakeholders, by actively pursuing and 
exploiting the power differentials between the firm and its 
stakeholders. Industrial organization economics, for example, 
suggest that for competitive advantages, a firm should focus on 
increasing the relative bargaining power over its stakeholders by 
raising entry barriers (Bain, 1956) or mobility barriers (Caves & 
Porter, 1977). By limiting competition or by restricting the 
alternative uses of the resources held by stakeholders within an 
industry or a strategic group, entry or mobility barriers lower 
even the market value of the resources. The firm thus attempts 
to appropriate not only the firm-specific value, but  also the 
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intrinsic value of the resources held by the stakeholders. The 
resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 
1984) also suggests that a firm appropriate as much value as 
possible from the resource holders, emphasizing high 
"immobility" of resources for competitive advantage. 
Agency theory argues that the contract structures of most 
organizational forms limit the risks undertaken by most agents 
by specifying either fixed promised payoffs or incentive payoffs 
tied to specific measures of performance. The residual risk - i.e., 
the risk of difference between stochastic cash inflows and 
promised payments to agents - is borne by those who contracted 
for the rights to net cash flows. Calling these agents the residual 
claimants or residual risk bearers, the theory continues to assert 
that the contracts of most agents contain the implicit or explicit 
provision that, in exchange for the specified payoff, the agent 
agrees that resources he/she provides can be used to satisfy the 
interests of residual claimants (Fama & Jensen,  1983). 
Therefore, most value should be appropriated for the 
shareholders who are the residual claimants. 
3. Value Appropriation and Trust 
This section presents how the ways of appropriating value 
among major stakeholders affect the development of mutual 
trust with them. After briefly describing the concepts of trust 
used in this study, this section will show how detrimental the 
value appropriation proposed in existing theories is to the 
formulation of trust among the stakeholders, and then introduce 
fair value appropriation as an effective mechanism for producing 
trust among them. 
3.1 The Concepts of lkust 
In the trust literature, there are two perspectives on trust: the 
instrumental, or rational, perspective and the non-instrumental 
perspective. According to the instrumental perspective, people's 
willingness to cooperate is based on a belief or expectation that 
others will reciprocate the cooperation (Brann & Foddy, 1988; 
Kramer, 1991; Messick, et al., 1983; vier & Kramer, 1996). 
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Assume that a particular individual cooperates while the other 
parties involved in the cooperative relationship do not cooperate. 
Then, the individual's isolated cooperation will not lead to much 
impact on the cooperative outcomes, and will be costly for the 
individual as he/she assumes all the costs associated with that 
cooperation while the other parties enjoy the benefits. Therefore, 
in the absence of expectations that the other parties will 
reciprocate, it will be difficult for an individual to cooperate 
(Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 1996). There is widespread evidence 
for this instrumental perspective of trust (e.g., Brann & Foddy, 
1988; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Komorita, Chan, & Parks, 1993; 
Messick et al., 1983; Tyler & Degoey, 1996). 
The non-instrumental perspective of trust views trust as an 
"orientation toward society and toward others that has social 
meaning beyond rational calculations" (Tyler & Kramer, 1996: 
5). In this perspective, people help or trust others, not only 
because they expect that others will reciprocate, but also 
because "they feel it is the morally appropriate action" (Tyler & 
Kramer, 1996: 5). That is, people trust when they have internal- 
ized positive orientation toward others, or have moral duty or 
obligation to others. 
When people have moral obligation to others, they, through 
psychological transformation (Kelly, 1979), tend to: have more 
positive perception of others' actions ; reduce the perceived 
social distance with others and the distinction of their outcomes 
with others, and increase affective satisfaction through their 
trust behavior (Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 1996). Therefore, even 
when objective expectation about an event is negative, the 
individual's subjective belief in the event becomes positive 
through cognitive, motivational, and affective psychological 
transformations of the event. 
The two perspectives, instrumental and non-instrumental, 
suggest that the definition of trust needs to incorporate both 
instrumental and non-instrumental aspects. In addition, a 
decision to trust is made in risky situations where there are 
ambiguous courses of action in the future, where outcomes 
depend on the behavior of others, and where the strength of the 
harmful event is greater than that of the beneficial event (Deut- 
sch, 1960). This means that trust is necessary in situations 
where those being trusted have opportunities for malfeasance 
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(Granovetter, 1985; Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
In this paper, trust is defined as "subjective and positive belief 
in the consequences of another's action with respect to oneself 
in uncertain environmental states." This definition contains both 
the instrumental and non-instrumental aspects of trust ,  
together with situational parameters. "Positive" in this definition 
represents the instrumental aspect of trust, i.e., another's action 
will be beneficial rather than detrimental (Gambetta, 1988; 
Creed & Miles, 1996). "Subjective" indicates the non-instrumen- 
tal aspect of trust that the expectation about the consequences 
of another's actions is psychologically transformed (Kelly, 1979) 
by moral obligation to others. Finally, trust is not simply 
expectation, but "belief' in the face of highly uncertain settings. 
Now, how do the ways of appropriating value affect trust of 
stakeholders in the firm? 
3.2 Value Appropriation and Trust 
Value appropriation in existing theories and trust 
The traditional agency theory argues that since the residual 
risk is borne by shareholders, most value should be appropri- 
ated to the shareholders. However, the risk taken by other 
stakeholders may be higher than the residual risk borne by the 
shareholders. If markets are efficient and adjust quickly to new 
circumstances as  traditional agency theory assumes, an 
individual stakeholder may minimize risks by adjusting to 
changing market conditions either through fixed promised 
payoffs or through incentive payoffs tied to specific measure of 
performance. 
Markets, however, are changing all the time due to either the 
process of creative destruction triggered by innovation (Schu- 
mpeter, 1942) or due to exogenous macro-environmental trends, 
such as demographics, sociopolitical factors, and macroeco- 
nomic change. That is, as Austrian economists argue, there is 
continuous and permanent disequilibrium in the markets 
(Jacobson, 1992). Once market conditions have changed, it is 
difficult for stakeholders to make new fair contracts reflecting 
their contributions to the firm, due to their investments in firm- 
specific assets. Firm-specific assets means the assets that 
cannot be deployed to alternative use without a loss of value 
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(Williamson, 1985). Once a stakeholder has made significant 
investments in such assets, the stakeholder cannot leave the 
firm without bearing substantial loss due to these firm-specific 
investments, leading to significant power differentials between 
the firm and its stakeholders. These power differentials make it 
difficult for the stakeholder to write a new contract reflecting the 
stakeholder's fair contributions, i.e., his/her firm-specific 
investments, to the firm. Therefore, the firm-specific investments 
by stakeholders become "appropriable quasi-rents" (Klein, 
Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). In this sense, the stakeholders who 
have made significant firm-specific investments may take higher 
risk in the firm than the shareholders who take residual risk, 
but make little firm-specific investments. 
Quasi-rents that are appropriated to the firm or only to 
shareholders, not to the stakeholders who have made the firm- 
specific investments for the quasi-rents, are therefore highly 
destructive with regard to securing trust from the stakeholders. 
When a stakeholder invests in firm-specific assets ,  the 
stakeholder makes an implicit contract where the stakeholder 
expects payoffs in exchange for his/her firm-specific invest- 
ments. If the payoffs that are expected are not made to the 
stakeholder, the stakeholder's confidence or trust in the firm will 
be severely damaged. If, as the agency theory suggests, a firm 
appropriates most ot the value, particularly quasi-rents, only for 
shareholders, all the other stakeholders who have made sub- 
stantial investments in firm-specific assets will lose any positive 
confidence or trust in the firm. Therefore, the way of appropria- 
ting value proposed by the traditional agency theory destroys 
trust of the stakeholders. 
The prescriptions of industrial organization economics and the 
resource-based view are more damaging to obtaining trust from 
stakeholders. These views suggest that the firm should appropri- 
ate not only the firm-specific value, but also the intrinsic value 
of the resources held by the stakeholders by limiting competition 
through entry or mobility barriers or through isolating 
mechanisms. 
Fair value appropriation and trust 
The agency theory views a firm as the nexus of implicit and 
explicit contracts among resource holders or stakeholders (Fama 
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& Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These contracts, or 
internal "rules of the game," specify the rights of each resource 
holder, performance criteria on which resource holders are eval- 
uated, and the payoff functions they face (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). 
The theory defines an agency relationship as a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. 
Agency theory then holds that, in the agency relationship, the 
agent as a utility maximizer does not always act in the best 
interests of the principal. Such agency problems occur when (1) 
conflicts of interests arise: agents and principals have different 
interests and when (2) information asymmetries arise: principals 
do not control the information necessary to verify that agents 
are acting in the principals' interests (Abrahamson & Park, 
1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
While agency theorists have been primarily interested in the 
agency problem between the stockholders and managers of a 
firm, the agency problem is quite general and, thus, exists "in all 
organizations and in all cooperative efforts-at every level of 
management in firms." (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 309). Agency 
theory may be thus used to explain the nature of the implicit 
and explicit contractual relationships between all stakeholders 
of the firm (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
Stakeholders refer to groups of constituents who have a 
legitimate claim on the firm, including stockholders, managers, 
employees, buyers, and suppliers (Freeman, 1984). Each of 
these groups can be seen as engaging in implicit and explicit 
contractual relationships where each group provides the firm 
with critical resources ("contribution") and in exchange each 
expects its interests to be satisfied ("inducement") (March & 
Simon, 1958; Hill & Jones, 1992). For example, stockholders 
supply the firm with capital. In exchange, they expect the firm 
maximizes the risk-adjusted return on their investment. 
Employees provide the firm with time, skills, and human capital 
commitments. In exchange, they expect fair income and ade- 
quate working conditions. Suppliers provide the firm with inputs 
and expect fair prices and dependable buyers in exchange. 
Customers supply the firm with revenues and expect value in 
14 Seoul Journal o f  Business 
exchange for money. In this sense, a firm may be viewed as a 
nexus of implicit and explicit contracts between all stakeholders. 
Compared to the contracts of other stakeholders, the contracts 
of managers is somewhat complex and unique (Hill & Jones, 
1992). Being positioned at the center of the nexus of contracts, 
managers are the only group of stakeholders who enter into a 
contractual relationship with all other stakeholders. In addition, 
managers are also the only group of stakeholders with direct 
control over the decision-making apparatus of the firm. That is, 
managers are the only group of stakeholders with abilities to 
make strategic decisions and allocate resources so that the 
claims of all the other stakeholder groups can be fairly satisfied 
(Hill & Jones, 1992). 
The abovementioned unique nature of the contract with man- 
agers has significant implications for the role of managers in the 
firm. Engaging in  multiple contracts with all the  other 
stakeholders and possessing direct control over strategic 
decisions and resources, managers in the contracts are expected 
to satisfy the claims of all stakeholder groups, not just the claims 
of the shareholders. 
Furthermore, while having a responsibility to satisfy the 
claims of all the other stakeholder groups, the managers as one 
of the firm's major stakeholder groups also expect their claims to 
be satisfied. Like employees, the managers also expect fair 
income and adequate working conditions in exchange for their 
contribution. The managers however have direct control over 
decisions and resources to satisfy their own claims as well as 
the claims of other stakeholder groups. As a consequence, the 
agency problems exist not just between the managers and 
shareholders, but between the managers and all the other 
stakeholders. 
A firm can secure a minimum level of trust (instrumental 
trust) from stakeholders when tkle stakeholders expect the firm 
to reciprocate their contributions. Firm-specific assets cannot be 
deployed to alternative use without a loss of value (Williamson, 
1985). Therefore, compared to stakeholders with low stakes, 
stakeholders with high stakes expect more value appropriation 
in exchange for their high firm-specific investments. Here, 
fairness in value appropriation thus means appropriating value 
according to each actor's stake in thefirm which is a function of 
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the actor's investments in firm-specific assets (Williamson, 1984; 
Hill & Jones, 1992). 
In order to secure the minimum level of trust, i.e., instrumen- 
tal trust, the firm should thus appropriate more value for the 
stakeholders with higher stakes than for the stakeholders with 
lower stake in the firm. Otherwise, the firm will not be able to 
maintain even the minimum level of trust from the involved 
stakeholders because their expectations are violated. Therefore, 
Proposition 1: The fairer the value appropriation by aJrm among 
its stakeholders, the higher the instrumental trust of the 
stakeholders in theJr-m 
Fair value appropriation is critical to building non-instrumen- 
tal trust as well as instrumental trust. Fair value appropriation 
provides in ternal  organizational members,  particularly 
managers, with good opportunities to strengthen their moral 
obligation to others and their identification with others, the 
primary mechanisms for building non-instrumental trust  
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Tyler & 
Kramer, 1996; Zucker, 1986). That is, while working for other 
stakeholders through fair value appropriation, managers tend to 
internalize a moral obligation to these stakeholders, together 
with a strong identification with them. When the  other 
stakeholders perceive the managers a s  having strong moral 
obligation and identification with respect to them, they are also 
likely to build strong identification with the managers, resulting 
in strong subjective a s  well a s  objective confidence in the 
consequences of the  managers '  act ions t h a t  affect the  
stakeholders. Thus, through the process of fair value appropria- 
tion, the fxm can obtain strong non-instrumental trust as well 
as instrumental trust. 
Assume that fair value appropriation is effected for internal 
stakeholders, e.g., employees, by managers. Fair value appropri- 
ation requires the managers to suppress their own interests in 
the interest of employees. While the managers suppress their 
own interests for the employees, the managers begin to take it 
for granted that they work for their employees. In the process, 
that is, the managers are more likely to believe that it is morally 
appropriate to sacrifice their own interests for the employees. 
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When the employees believe that the managers possess strong 
moral obligation to and identification with the employees, they 
are also likely to be convinced that it is morally right to sacrifice 
their own interests, leading to strong trust in the managers. 
When fair value appropriation is made for external stake- 
holders by internal organizational members, the effects are the 
same. While working for the external stakeholders, the internal 
organizational members build strong identification with and 
moral obligations to the external stakeholders. In turn, the 
external stakeholders will also build strong identification with 
these internal organization and the firm as a whole. 
One diversified firm has actively pursued fair value appropria- 
tion for external stakeholders a s  well a s  for internal stake- 
holders. As one of such activities, the firm has promoted a cam- 
paign, "One Group Company, One Mountain." In the campaign, 
each group company of the diversified firm is required to take 
care of an actual, specific mountain assigned to that company; 
this includes the protection of the mountain from environmental 
contamination. One executive of the company said, 
"We are promoting this campaign not just to get more 
favorable evaluation and reputation from our customers or 
the public in general, but also to provide opportunities for our 
employees to strengthen their humanism and morality and; 
thus, moral obligation to others. If our employees have built 
strong moral obligation to the public in general, they will have 
much stronger moral obligation to and identification with 
more immediate stakeholders, such as buyers, suppliers and 
shareholders. Moral obligation to or identification among 
internal organizational members would be even stronger." 
Finally, fair value appropriation and the development of organ- 
izational members with strong moral obligation to and  
identification with other stakeholders are highly interdependent 
and reinforcing with each. That is, fair value appropriation 
enables the organizational members to strengthen their moral 
obligation to and identification with the other stakeholders. At 
the same time, when the organizational members have developed 
strong moral obligation to and identification with other 
stakeholders, they may be better able to appropriate value fairly 
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among the other stakeholders. Therefore, the two processes are 
highly interrelated and reinforcing. Since moral obligation to and 
identification with others are the major mechanisms for develop- 
ing non-instrumental trust, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 2: Fair value appropriation for stakeholders and non- 
instrumental trust of the stakeholders will be highly interrelated 
and reinforce each other. 
4. Mutual Trust and Value Maximization 
How does trust among major stakeholders contribute to the 
value maximization? Most studies in economics and organization 
theory emphasize trust as a mechanism for value appropriation. 
Viewing other governance mechanisms, e.g., formalization 
through explicit contracts, as necessary only when trust is 
disrupted or too costly to build (Evan, 1963; Geertz, 1978; 
Macaulay, 1963), these studies suggest that trust is the most 
efficient mechanism for governing transactions (e.g., Arrow, 
1970, 1974; Ouchi, 1980) and, thus, the most efficient mecha- 
nism for maximizing the appropriation of value by firms. The 
position of this article is that trust is not merely an efficient 
mechanism for value appropriation by firms, but an effective 
mechanism for value maximization. 
4.1 Mutual Trust and Intrinsic Value 
Building mutual trust with resource holders, i.e., major stake- 
holders, is  one of the most effective ways of acquiring, 
developing and retaining resources with high intrinsic value. 
Mutual trust enables a firm to acquire valuable resources and 
retain them by creating "mutual attractiveness" between the firm 
and the resource holders (Ghoshal, Moran, & Bartlett, 1996). 
Unlike less valuable resource holders (e.g., employees and 
suppliers) who often lack self-competence, and thus, are highly 
passive and dependent, valuable resource holders are highly 
competent, self-directed and motivated, and independent. Those 
valuable resource holders are thus more highly attracted to a 
firm that has developed a reputation of trusting its stakeholders, 
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so that they can enjoy self-accomplishment from their jobs, 
which is also beneficial for the firm. Therefore, through this 
trust-based mutual attractiveness, the firm can better attract 
resources with high intrinsic value and retain them within the 
firm. 
Trust also allows the firm to retain resources with high 
intrinsic value through "mutual affection" between the firm and 
the resource holders. When the involved parties have developed 
a high level of trust, i.e., non-instrumental trust, each party 
understands and identifies with the other party's needs, desires 
and preferences. Mutual affection from this strong identification 
between the firm and the resource providers makes it difficult 
for the resource providers to leave the firm. 
Furthermore, non-instrumental trust also permits the firm to 
enhance the intrinsic value of existing resources through 
"mutual sacrifice" among the resource holders. As Ghoshal et al. 
(1996) noted, internal training to increase the intrinsic value of a 
particular resource requires the investment of other resource 
holders with high intrinsic value (e.g., in-house training by 
seniors for juniors). When the resource holders have developed 
non-instrumental trust and, thus, share the others' desires and 
needs, each resource holder is willing to sacrifice for other 
resource holders. Therefore, for example, seniors are willing to 
invest their time and efforts in raising the intrinsic value of 
juniors. In sum, mutual trust enables the firm to acquire, 
develop, and retain resources with high intrinsic value, through 
mutual attractiveness, mutual affection, and mutual sacrifice. 
Therefore, 
Proposition 3: The higher mutual trust of a firm with its 
stakeholders, the higher intrinsic value of the resources in the 
fum 
The criticalness of intrinsic value to firm-specific value and 
synergetic value 
As defined earlier, the intrinsic value of a resource is the value 
which is independent of the resource users. Whoever uses the 
resource, the resource produces the same amount of intrinsic 
value. If the market for the resource is efficient, or firms have 
the same expectations about the future value of the resource 
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(Barney, 1986), the intrinsic value of the resource is equal to its 
market value. Unless the firm permanently owns the resource, 
the firm has to pay for the resource at least equal to or more 
than the intrinsic value of the resource. Otherwise, the resource 
provider will leave the firm for other firms that are willing to pay 
more than what the current firm is paying. Therefore, Ricardian 
rents from this resource are always zero or negative. 
Although a firm cannot appropriate any rents from the 
intrinsic value of resources, retaining superior resources with 
high intrinsic value is critical to the firm's competitive advantage 
for the following two reasons. Firstly, the firm-specific value of or 
quasi-rents from a resource may not be significant when the 
resource has low intrinsic value. The firm-specific value of the 
resource is created largely by the resource holder recognizing the 
value of firm-specific knowledge, assimilating it, and exploiting 
it. This ability of the resource holders to recognize the value of 
firm-specific knowledge, assimilate the firm-specific knowledge, 
and exploit it, i.e., "absorptive capacity," is determined by prior 
related knowledge of the resource holders (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). By definition, the intrinsic value of the resource is 
tradeable, and thus, broadly applicable. Therefore, the high 
intrinsic value of the resource thus indicates that existing 
knowledge of the resource holder is highly fungible or flexible 
(Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991), and thus, his/her absorptive 
capacity is broader. When the intrinsic value of the resource is 
high, therefore, the firm is in a better position to create high 
firm-specific value of the resource than when the intrinsic value 
of the resource is low. 
Secondly, resources with high intrinsic value are important for 
Schumpeterian rents as  well as  for quasi-rents. Like firm- 
specific value, the synergetic value or Schumpeterian rents can 
be acquired when each resource holder possesses high 
absorptive capacity, which makes it easier for the resource 
holder to acquire knowledge from other available resources; this 
thus enables resources to be more effectively and efficiently 
combined with each other. 
Resources with high intrinsic value further facilitate the 
creation of Schumpeterian rents by reducing the amount of trial- 
and-error search involved in new resource combinations. Nelson 
& Winter (1982) imply tha t  a n  effective new resource 
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combination usually requires a significant amount of trial-and- 
error search. Through the trial-and-error search, a firm detects, 
diagnoses, and solves obstacles to effective performance of the 
new combination. Resources with high intrinsic value are likely 
to be more reliable, and thus, to contribute less to the problems 
arising from the new resource combination, reducing the 
amount of the trial-and-error search. 
The high intrinsic value of resources also contributes to 
Schumpeterian rents by lowering the "operational ambiguity" 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982: 88) of the resources. The operational 
ambiguity is defined as "predictive uncertainty as  to what a 
particular individual who possesses 'the skill' can actually 
accomplish in an attempt to exercise that skill under particular 
circumstances" (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 88) .  The high 
operational ambiguity of resources leads to significant diffi- 
culties in the designs of the new combination. Of course, some of 
the operational ambiguity can be eliminated by clanfylng quality 
differentials among resource holders and task characteristics. 
However, neither of these sorts of clarification is costless, and 
neither can be totally effective (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Therefore, reliable resources with high intrinsic value increases 
the potential for the firm to create high synergetic value. As 
Nelson & Winter (1982) suggested, success on the innovative 
frontier may depend on the quality of the support from the 
"civilized" regions of existing resources. 
Retaining existing resources with high intrinsic value is also 
important because the loss of the resources is highly costly to 
the firm. It is costly because the firm might have already 
invested in the improvement of the resource's intrinsic value for 
more firm-specific tasks in the form of various trainings in 
general skills. If the resource has contributed to synergetic value 
through combinations with other resources, the cost of its loss 
will be even higher. 
In sum, acquiring and retaining resources with high intrinsic 
value are critical for a firm to achieve competitive advantage 
since those resources can make significant contributions to both 
quasi-rents and Schumpeterian rents. 
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4.2 Mutual Trust and Firm-Specific Value 
It has been widely recognized that firm-specific value is one of 
the most important sources for competitive advantages. 
Therefore, it is important that resource providers make invest- 
ments in the development of the firm-specific value of their 
resources. Unlike investments in the intrinsic value, however, 
investments in the firm-specific value create "appropriable" 
quasi-rents (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) and thus increase 
the potential for the opportunism of the firm. Therefore, 
investments in the firm-specific value require the resource 
providers either to have assurance that the firm will not behave 
opportunistically and attempt to appropriate those quasi-rents 
from the investments or to be emotionally willing to sacrifice for 
the firm. 
Instrumental trust increases the resource providers' expecta- 
tions that the firm will reciprocate their investments in the firm- 
specific value, i.e., that the firm will not behave opportunistically 
or attempt to appropriate the quasi-rents from the investments. 
With non-instrumental trust, the resource providers are not 
concerned about the possibility of the firm's opportunistic 
behavior because the resource providers identify with the firm's 
interests and desires, allowing the resource providers to be 
willing to sacrifice for the firm by making firm-specific invest- 
ments. Therefore, 
Proposition 4: The higher mutual trust of a firm with its 
stakeholders, the higherfirm-specijlc value of the resources in the 
firm 
4 3  Mutual Trust and Synergetic Value 
The primary sources of synergetic value are resource sharing 
and knowledge transfer. Resource sharing involves the combina- 
tion and rationalization of some of the operating, tangible 
resources available to different parties of the firm, due to their 
functional and performance similarity. Such resource sharing 
increases a firm's competitive advantages by lowering costs 
through economies of scale or economies of scope, or by 
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enhancing differentiation through increasing the uniqueness of 
the shared activity (Porter, 1985). 
Resource sharing, however, involves significant transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1985). As Porter (1985) identified, resource 
sharing requires the design or performance of the resource to be 
compromised, which may not be optimal for either of the parties 
involved. In addition, sharing the resource among different 
parties makes it difficult to respond quickly to environmental 
changes since responding to the changes in one party may 
reduce the value of interrelationship for the other party involved. 
Since resource sharing requires compromise and inflexibility 
from the involved parties, it increases the possibility of the 
involved party's opportunistic behavior and, thus, potential 
transaction costs. 
Mutual trust reduces the transaction costs associated with 
resource sharing, such as contracting costs, monitoring costs, 
and enforcement costs (Hennart, 1993; Williamson, 1985). 
Contracting costs indicate the costs associated with negotiating 
and writing an agreement, for example, about scheduling, 
setting priorities, and resolving problems. Under conditions of 
trust, the parties involved in resource sharing have a strong 
belief that the other party will recipr~cate~their efforts and that 
fair adjustments thus will be made as future conditions change. 
Therefore, the parties do not need to engage in the complex 
negotiation and writing of a contract about all future contingen- 
cies to prevent the other party's opportunistic behavior. 
Mutual trust also reduces the monitoring costs that refer to 
the costs associated with monitoring the contract to ensure that 
each involved party fulfills the predetermined set of obligations. 
Mishira (1996: 265) identified four dimensions or components of 
trust, defining trust as "one party's willingness to be vulnerable 
to another party based on the belief that the latter party is (a) 
competent, (b) open, (c) concerned, and (d) reliable." Because the 
parties in the trust relationships believe that the other party is, 
not only willing (i.e., "open", "concerned" and "reliable") to, but 
also able (i.e., "competent") to fulfill the obligations, the parties 
do not need to engage in intensive monitoring. 
Finally, mutual trust among the parties involved in resource 
sharing reduces enforcement costs, the costs associated with ex 
post haggling and sanctioning the party that does not perform 
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according to predetermined agreement. When the parties trust 
each other, each party is "concerned" about the other party's 
interests (Mishira, 1996) and attributes the consequences of the 
other party's behavior more positively. Therefore, the involved 
parties do not engage in severe ex post bargaining and haggling 
over the results. 
Instead of building mutual trust, firms can also devise organi- 
zational mechanisms, such as organizational structure, systems, 
and processes, to reduce the transaction costs associated with 
resource sharing (Galbraith, 1973; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986; 
Hage, Aiken, & Marrett, 1971; Van de Ven, Delbecq & Koenig, 
1976; Williamson, 1985). However, such organizational solutions 
also incur significant costs on firms (Nayyar, 1992). 
Even when a resource cannot be shared directly, it may be 
utilized in the form of knowledge transfer. It has been well 
recognized that  knowledge transfer both within a firm and 
outside the firm is critical to the firm's innovative capabilities, or 
its ability to create synergetic value from resource combinations 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Mansfield, 1968; March & Simon, 
1958). While knowledge transfer has been well known a s  a 
crucial source of a firm's competitive advantages, the difficulties 
in knowledge transfer have been also noted by many researchers 
(Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Porter, 1985; Park, 1995). As major 
sources of the difficulties in knowledge transfer, this article 
presents two fundamental characteristics of knowledge: 
tacitness and stickiness. 
The most common dimension of knowledge classification is 
"tacitness" (Nonaka, 1994; Polyani, 1966; Winter, 1987). 
Whereas articulated knowledge refers to explicit, formal and 
codified knowledge, tacit knowledge is defined as implicit and 
highly personal, people-embedded knowledge that is difficult to 
codify or communicate. The difficulty to communicate or trans- 
fer tacit knowledge comes largely from its causal ambiguity, i.e., 
ambiguity about the relationships between actions and results 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). Therefore, the possessor of this tacit 
knowledge is not fully aware of the details of the knowledge and 
finds it difficult or impossible to G c u l a t e  a full account of those 
details (Nelson & Winter, 1982). This causal ambiguity inherent 
in tacit knowledge often acts a s  a powerful barrier to both 
imitation and factor mobility (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982) and, 
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thus, is an effective source of competitive advantages. 
Due to causal ambiguity, therefore, the effective transfer of 
tacit knowledge requires a firm to have high "absorptive capaci- 
ty," i.e., the ability to recognize the value of new knowledge, 
assimilate it and apply it  to commercial ends  (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). Since a firm's absorptive capacity is largely a 
function of the level of prior related knowledge, it is difficult for 
the firm to acquire knowledge from novel domains. Without 
diverse internal knowledge structure, the firm's learning tends 
to be highly incremental, domain-specific, and path- or history- 
dependent (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 199 1). 
A firm's adsorptive capacity depends not only on the ability to 
acquire knowledge from outside the firm (i.e., "outward-looking" 
absorptive capacity), bu t  also on the  ability to transfer 
knowledge across and within subunits of the firm (i.e., "inward- 
looking" absorptive capacity) (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). While 
outward-looking absorptive capacity necessitates diverse 
internal knowledge to tap into diverse external knowledge 
sources, inward-looking absorptive capacity requires highly 
overlapping and related knowledge structure for efficient 
internal communications. Due to this trade-off between inward- 
looking versus outward-looking absorptive capacity, the firm is 
forced to make choice between the two or to compromise them, 
as neither of them is optimal for the firm's innovations. 
Mutual trust  with stakeholders improves both outward- 
looking and inward-looking absorptive capacity and, thereby, 
overcomes a considerable portion of impediments associated 
with transferring tacit knowledge. Like human perception (Barr, 
Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Daft & Weick, 1984; Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988; Schwenk, 1984), a firm's existing knowledge may 
affect its ability to recognize the value of new knowledge and 
assimilate it, through the following two processes : scanning, 
through which the existing knowledge directs or limits attention 
to a limited range of new knowledge that are highly related to the 
existing knowledge; and interpretation, through which the new 
knowledge that gained attention is first understood with respect 
to the existing knowledge and then given meanings. 
Consider interorganizational knowledge transfer where new 
knowledge is not related to existing knowledge. If the source of 
the new knowledge is one of the stakeholders that a firm trusts, 
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the firm with strong concern about and interests in the 
stakeholder will not ignore the new knowledge in the scanning 
process although the new knowledge is not related to its existing 
knowledge. Therefore, the firm is better able to recognize the 
value of the new knowledge from the trustful stakeholder than 
the value of new knowledge from other firms. 
Furthermore, in the interpretation process, the new knowledge 
that gained attention will be understood and given meaning, not 
with respect to the firm's existing knowledge, but with respect to 
the other's standpoint. Thus, the firm is better able to assimilate 
the new knowledge from the stakeholder than from other firms 
that the firm does not trust. It follows that mutual trust among 
stakeholders increase a firm's outward-looking absorptive 
capacity of new knowledge from the stakeholders. 
At the same time, the knowledge-transferring stakeholder with 
trust in the firm is better able to identify the knowledge needed 
by the firm and to help the firm with assimilating the knowledge 
by better  unders tanding difficulties facing the  firm in  
assimilating the knowledge. For the same reason, mutual trust 
enhances inward-looking absorptive capacity. By enhancing 
both inward-looking and outward-looking absorptive capacity, 
trust overcomes many impediments to the transfer of tacit 
knowledge among stakeholders. 
Another characteristic of knowledge a s  an  impediment to 
knowledge transfer is "stickiness." Although many researchers 
have defined stickiness a s  inseparability of a n  asset  or 
knowledge, this paper uses the term of stickiness as referring to 
inseparability of knowledge due to motivational impediments. 
More specifically, knowledge is sticky in the sense that even if 
the parties involved in knowledge transfer are able to acquire 
new knowledge from external environments and to efficiently 
transfer the knowledge internally, they may not be willing to 
actively participate in the knowledge transfer. That is, although 
the involved parties have the "ability" to transfer knowledge, they 
may not have the "motivation" for the knowledge transfer. There- 
fore, while difficulties from the tacitness of knowledge depend on 
the  firm's ability in knowledge transfer (e.g., absorptive 
capacity), difficulties from the stickiness of knowledge depend on 
the involved parties' motivation for the knowledge transfer. 
Various factors contribute to the stickiness of knowledge, or 
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the unwillingness for knowledge transfer. Knowledge-receiving 
parties may resist accepting new outside knowledge due simply 
to the "Not-Invented-Here" (NIH) syndrome, i.e., the resistance of 
the knowledge-receiving parties to ideas or solutions that have 
been generated elsewhere and not by them (Allen, 1977; Bartlett 
& Ghoshal, 1989). Knowledge-transferring parties may be also 
reluctant to the knowledge transfer due to the importance of the 
skilled personnel required for the transfer in their businesses 
and to the risk that highly proprietary knowledge will leak out 
and will be used opportunistically (Porter, 1985). Since the 
stickiness of knowledge makes it difficult for articulated 
knowledge a s  well a s  tacit knowledge to be effectively trans- 
ferred, it is extremely important for a firm to overcome the 
stickiness of knowledge. 
When a firm has developed high mutual trust with its stake- 
holders (i.e., non-instrumental trust), each stakeholder feels 
strong identification with each other. NIH syndrome is thus 
much lower among these stakeholders. In addition, mutual sac- 
rifice inherent in non-instrumental trust and the belief that the 
other party will not behave opportunistically also enable the firm 
to overcome the knowledge transferring party's reluctance to the 
knowledge. As a result, mutual trust significantly reduces moti- 
vational impediments arising from the stickiness of knowledge. 
Since mutual trust lowers impediments to resource sharing 
and knowledge transfer which are the major sources of syner- 
gies, mutual  t r u s t  increases the  synergetic value of the  
resources. Therefore, 
Proposition 5: The higher mutual trust of a firm with its 
stakeholders, the higher synergetic value of the resources in the 
f i r m  
Finally, value maximization is also likely to facilitate fair value 
appropriation. An increase in value to be appropriated among 
stakeholders enables the firm to better satisfy the stakeholders' 
expectations through fair value appropriation. Therefore, 
Proposition 6: The higher value of a Jrm's outputs, the fairer 
value appropriation by theJrm 
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In summary, mutual trust among stakeholders is critical to 
value maximization because: it is one of the most effective 
means of acquiring, developing and retaining resources with 
high intrinsic value that is important for high firm-specific and 
synergetic value of the resources; it also increases the firm- 
specific value of each resource by facilitating firm-specific invest- 
ments by the resource holder; and it increases the synergetic 
value of the resources by reducing impediments to resource 
sharing and knowledge transfer. Finally, value maximization 'also 
facilitates fair value appropriation. As a resul t ,  value 
appropriation and value maximization are highly interrelated 
and reinforcing with each other through mutual trust as a key 
linkage between the two processes. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Thus far, we have seen the relationships between value appro- 
priation and value maximization and the critical roles played by 
mutual trust in these relationships. At this point, it may be 
worthwhile to discuss the roles of a firm in the economy. 
5.1 Social Legitimacy of a Firm 
In this article, the value of a firm's outputs consists of three 
components: the intrinsic value of the resources used for the 
outputs, the firm-specific value of the resources, and the 
synergetic value of the resources. A firm acquires resources with 
a certain intrinsic value from the market. In this sense, a market 
may be perceived a s  a mechanism to exchange the given 
intrinsic value of resources which have been created else where. 
That is, a market is a mechanism for value exchange. 
Acquiring resources with given intrinsic value from the 
market, a firm creates value: (1) by enhancing the given intrinsic 
value of the resources; (2) by producing their firm-specific value 
through resource holders' firm-specific investments; and (3) by 
maximizing the synergetic value from the combinations of 
resources available to the firm, aided by resource holders' 
voluntary cooperation. The final outputs of the firm are again 
exchanged in the market as  a resource with a specific, given 
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amount of intrinsic value that is equivalent to the sum of: the 
initial intrinsic value of the resources used in the firm, an 
increase in the intrinsic value within the firm, the firm-specific 
value of the resources, and their synergetic value. Therefore, a 
firm may be a mechanism for value creation, not simply for 
value exchange, whereas a market is a mechanism for value 
exchange. 
For value exchange that is a major role of a market, "effici- 
ency" may be critical. Market mechanisms are highly efficient for 
most value exchanges. For some value exchanges, however, the 
market mechanisms may not be so efficient due to high 
uncertainty and asset specificity inherent in those exchanges 
(Williamson, 1985). For such value exchanges, as transaction 
cost economics argues, a hierarchy may be more efficient than 
the market. However, a hierarchy is simply one type of market 
mechanisms in the sense that it is a mechanism for value 
exchange. In other words, like other market mechanisms, a 
hierarchy is a mechanism which may be more efficient for 
certain value exchanges that involve high uncertainty and high 
asset specificity. 
If a firm is viewed as a mechanism for value creation, not for 
value exchange, the firm should not be a simple hierarchy which 
may be useful to increase "efficiency" in certain value exchanges. 
The firm may need some other mechanisms, systems, processes, 
etc., not to enhance efficiency for value exchange, but to 
maximize value creation which is the major source of institu- 
tional legitimacy of the firm (Moran & Ghoshal, 1996). 
Whereas efficiency may be important for value exchange, what 
is crucial for value maximization? In this article, a firm creates 
value by enhancing the given, initial intrinsic value of resources 
acquired from the market and by maximizing their firm-specific 
and synergetic value. These value creating activities may require 
mutual attractiveness, mutual sacrifice, and mutual affection 
arising from mutual trust among the resource providers, whereas 
value exchange activities in the market require efficiency. 
Critical to a firm's social legitimacy and sustainable competi- 
tive advantage is thus the question of how to generate "mutual 
trust" among stakeholders, not the question of how to increase 
"efficiency" in the intrafirm-exchange of resources with certain 
intrinsic value. In this sense, a firm needs to be more cautious 
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about the adoption of such market mechanisms as performance- 
based payments, market-based employment, profit-centers, 
autonomous management, etc.,  which aim a t  enhancing 
efficiency in value exchange. Instead, the firm should place more 
attention on developing mechanisms for generating mutual trust 
among stakeholders to maximize value creation. This article 
suggests fair value appropriation as one such mechanism. 
5.2 Appropriability of "Appropriable Quasi-rents" 
Fair value appropriation in this article is the appropriation of 
value in proportion to the stake of each actor in the firm, which 
is a function of the actor's investments in firm-specific assets. In 
fair value appropriation, therefore, it is crucial that quasi-rents 
in particular are fairly appropriated among the stakeholders. In 
other words, quasi-rents are no longer "appropriable." 
Quasi-rents may be appropriable (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 
1978) through "unfair" value appropriation in the short-term, 
not in the long-term. The stakeholders are ones with a stake in 
the firm, which is a function of the stakeholders' investments in 
firm-specific assets. By definition, therefore, the stakeholders 
have made firm-specific investments to create firm-specific value 
or quasi-rents for the firm. In exchange, the stakeholders expect 
that the firm will reciprocate their firm-specific investments by 
appropriating the quasi-rents according to their stakes or their 
firm-specific investments. If the firm does not appropriate the 
quasi-rents for the stakeholders depending on their stakes, it 
violates the expectations of the stakeholders and thus, destroys 
trust in the firm. When the stakeholders do not have trust in the 
firm, they will no longer actively make firm-specific investments 
any more to create quasi-rents. In the long-term, therefore, there 
will be little quasi-rents to appropriate by the firm. It follows 
that quasi-rents may not be appropriable, regardless of whether 
thefirm fairly appropriates value or not. 
Difficulties facing the firm then may be to determine the 
magnitude of the fair stake of each stakeholder. Since managers 
engage in multiple contracts with all the other stakeholders and 
possess the direct control over strategic decisions and resources, 
the managers determine the magnitude of the fair stakes of the 
resource providers, including themselves. Determining the fair 
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stakes of the multiple resource providers and appropriating 
value according to the stakes are challenging, particularly when 
the managers are also one party of the resource providers with 
their own stake. These issues may be managerial challenges, 
and thus, managers may matter for these reasons. 
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